Digital Echo Chambers and Erosion of Trust - Key Threats to the US Elections

Cyber Threat Intelligence

22 Oct 2024

ai, elections, social media, influence campaigns, misinformation

Digital Echo Chambers and Erosion of Trust - Key Threats to the US Elections

Shaping Public Narratives

Social media plays a crucial role in shaping public narratives around candidates and issues. The way information is presented and discussed on these platforms can influence public perception and ultimately affect election results. For instance, negative narratives about candidates can gain traction quickly, impacting their support.

As traditional media consumption declines, many voters turn to social media for news and updates about elections. This shift drives more people to create accounts, particularly as they seek to engage with political content and discussions relevant to the elections. Foreign adversaries exploit this aspect for their own benefit, running influence campaigns to manipulate public opinion. To do that, they leverage accounts with monikers reflecting election sentiments and the names of political opponents to mislead voters.

Such activity has been identified not only in social media networks with HQ in the US, but also in foreign jurisdictions and alternative digital media channels. The actors may operate in less moderated environments, leveraging foreign social media and resources, which are also read by domestic audience, and the content from which could be easily distributed via mobile and email.

Resecurity has detected a substantial increase in the distribution of political content related to the 2024 US elections through social media networks, particularly from foreign jurisdictions.

Formation of Echo Chambers

Social media can create echo chambers where users are exposed primarily to information that reinforces their existing beliefs. This phenomenon can polarize public opinion, as individuals become less likely to encounter opposing viewpoints. Such environments can intensify partisan divides and influence voter behavior by solidifying biases.

For example, on October 5, 2024, Resecurity identified multiple accounts for sale on Telegram that were impersonating government entities, including the White House, the FBI and the CIA, as well as popular media outlets such as CNN and the Washington Post. One of the accounts impersonating Donald Trump, 'DonaldTrump_feedback,' was also put up for sale. The accounts were offered for sale on Fragment, a marketplace for Telegram accounts.

Multiple Telegram accounts with the U.S. elections narrative have been identified; they have been registered and offered for sale between 10 TON ($51) and 2028 TON ($2290). Such accounts will be of great interest to political consultancies and foreign adversaries aiming to target a specific segment of the audience.

One such account (@elections) was sold on October 18, 2023 - almost a year before the elections.

Currently, this account spreads content designed to shape negative opinions about political candidates and discredit U.S. elections. One of the foreign adversaries' critical goals is to plant social polarization and distrust in electoral integrity. This is a crucial component of these campaigns. Often, these campaigns promote and discourage both candidates, as they do not intend to promote one candidate over the other. They plan to sow distrust in the election process and encourage animosity among the constituents of the losing candidate against the winning candidate and their supporters.

Multiple postings have been identified that outline the elections as insecure or manipulated, using the profiles of candidates and other notable figures.

Resecurity identified several associated groups promoting the "echo" narrative - regardless of the main profile of the group. For example, a group that aims to support the Democratic Party contained content of an opposite and discrediting nature.

Notably, most user profiles identified in such groups contain vague descriptions and patterns characteristic of 'troll factories'.

Example:

Misinformation and Influence Operations

Similar identified accounts are being used in similar ways to target Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the President of Ukraine, and Maia Sandu, a Moldovan politician who has been President of Moldova since December 24, 2020, becoming the country's first female president in its history.

Analysts are warning of a “large-scale hybrid war” by foreign adversaries against Moldova - as it moves toward a presidential election (Sunday, October 20, 2024), during which a referendum on future relations with the European Union will also be held. Notably, the Telegram account designed to discredit Moldova’s incumbent president, Maia Sandu, who supports the country’s integration with Europe, appeared one month before the referendum. “It’s unprecedented in terms of complexity,” says Ana Revenco, Moldova’s former interior minister, now in charge of the country’s new Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation. Similar activities have also been identified on TikTok and other social media platforms. “This shows us our collective vulnerability,” she says.

Resecurity has observed notable activity of a similar nature originating from the Vkontakte (VK) social network. Our team has assigned the codename "Psy Ops, Inc." to this activity, which is the name of one of the accounts identified earlier that was involved in planting such content online.

Resecurity identified several clusters of accounts with patterns of a 'troll factory' that promotes negative content against the U.S. and EU leadership via VK, written in various languages including French, Finnish, German, Dutch, and Italian.

The content is mixed with geopolitical narratives of an antisemitic nature, which should clearly violate the existing Terms and Conditions of the network. The accounts remain active and constantly release updates, which may highlight the organized effort to produce such content and make it available online. A month ago, the United States Department of Justice charged threat actors working for a foreign state-controlled media outlet in a $10 million scheme to create and distribute content to U.S. audiences with hidden Russian government messaging.

Significance

Foreign adversaries' efforts underscore the need for robust measures to protect election integrity and democracy. As technology advances, developing effective strategies for addressing these challenges is crucial. This includes implementing clear regulations, enhancing platform policies, and promoting public awareness about the potential risks of manipulated media, in addition to a robust effort to identify and disrupt the infrastructure to conduct these misinformation campaigns.

Launching misinformation campaigns via social media and web resources in foreign jurisdictions, adversaries often bypass existing moderation controls of platforms within the political campaign's jurisdiction and affect specific audience segments. Such content is available and indexed by major search engines and can be disseminated through digital, mobile, and alternative platform-specific channels worldwide. Resecurity forecasts that foreign actors will continue to accelerate their use of such tactics, considering the hardened oversight of social media companies based in the U.S., which could limit foreign adversaries' freedom of action. Even though such activity may be focused on targeting specific political candidates, it also benefits the adversaries as it creates a negative public image for the U.S. internationally and distrust in the democratic institutions that it promotes around the world.

Conclusion

While the threat from foreign actors using media manipulation is growing, intelligence assessments indicate that these efforts, though significant, are not yet revolutionary in their impact. Nevertheless, the U.S. agencies remain vigilant, continuously updating their assessments and working to safeguard the integrity of the 2024 election against these evolving threats. By understanding these issues and advocating for responsible media practices, governments, platforms, and the public can work together to build a more informed and secure digital environment - that upholds the integrity of elections and defends against the exploitation of emerging technologies.